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INTRODUCTION
The law of recourse to force has changed dramatically over the
last centuries. The theory and practice of the use of force during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was that of bellum justum.1
The bellum justum doctrine, which originated in the Middle Ages,
legitimised the resort to violence in international law as a procedure
of self-help only if certain criteria were met relating to a belligerent's
authority to make war, its objectives and its intent.2
The doctrine of bellum justum was an objective one in the late
Middle Ages; an independent organisation, the supreme
ecclesiastical authority of Rome, supervised the justice of warfare.3
After the Reformation, with its disintegrating impact on the unity and
authority of the Church, the bellum justum doctrine lost its central
supervision and became a subjective one.4 Each belligerent was, in
effect, "his own and final judge" of thejustum aspect of his war.5
The Covenant of the League of Nations represented a first
significant break with the traditional theory and practice of thejus ad
bellum.6 The Covenant placed "resort to war" under international
1. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION, 131-32 (1961) (defining the principle of"bellum iustum").
2. See Hans Wehberg, L 'interdiction du Recours e la Force. Le Principe et les
Problmes qui se posent, 1951-I RECUEILS DES COURS 1, 11-20 (1951) (noting
preconditions to use of force).
3. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 133 ("The degree of unity
and centralized organisation of authority achieved by the Papacy was such that
medieval Christendom has been described by a scholar as an 'international
state.'").
4. See id. at 133-34 (describing the changes brought about by the Reformation
and the consequences of these changes).
5. Id. at 131-38 (noting that this was the result of a lack of effective central
authority).
6. See id. at 138 (noting that there were other minor efforts to limit thejus ad
bellum of traditional law).
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supervision, and rendered it unlawful in four situations: (1) when
made without prior submission of the dispute to arbitration or
judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council of the League;7 (2)
when begun before the expiration of three months after the arbitral
award or judicial decision or Council report;8 (3) when commenced
against a member which had complied with such award or decision
or recommendation of a unanimously adopted Council report;9 and,
(4) under certain circumstances, when initiated by a non-member
state against a member state.'°
The major breakthrough came about seventy years ago, when
international law reached the position where it could outlaw war as
such, as an instrument of international policy. 1 The 1928 General
Treaty for the Renunciation of War ("Kellogg-Briand Pact" or "Pact
of Paris") first reflected this principle by condemning "recourse to
war for the solution of international controversies," setting out
various undertakings to renounce "war as an instrument of national
policy.' 2 This prohibition of threat or use of force was repeated in
Article 2(4) of the United Nations ("U.N.") Charter.
3
7. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, June 28, 1919, art. 12, reprinted in
THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at 100
(J.A.S. Grenville & Bernard Wasserstein eds., 2001) (requiring Members to submit
disputes to arbitration, judicial settlement or inquiry); id. art. 13 (stating that
Members may not resort to war with fellow Members who comply with the
covenant's provisions); McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, 131-38
(explaining the war-related provisions in the Covenant).
8. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 13.
9. Id. art. 15 (noting that if a report is unanimously agreed to, Members may
not go to war with a complying Member).
10. Id. art. 17 (outlining procedures for disputes involving non-Member states).
11. See Roberto Ago, Addendum to the 8th Report on State Responsibility,
[1980] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 52, para. 83, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/ADD. 52
(defining self-defence as the use of force "where the use of force would take the
form of resistance to a violent attack by another").
12. Treaty between the United States and other Powers providing for the
Renunciation of War as an instrument of national policy, Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 46
Stat. 2343, 2345, 94 L.N.T.S. 57,59 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; see
McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 139-41 (explaining the 1928 treaty).
See generally Quincy Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. J. INT'L L.
39 (1933) (discussing the obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact).
13. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (requiring Members to refrain from using
force against other states); see also Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and
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The right of self-defence is closely related to the jus ad bellum.14
As long as war could be lawful under the bellum justum doctrine,
international law would simply regard self-defence as a counter-war
against an illegal war. 5 However, as soon as warfare was in principle
outlawed under the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the U.N. Charter, the
notion of self-defence became a critical exception, restricting the use
of force in a world united under the flag of international peace and
security.
16
The purpose of this article is to present the notion of anticipatory
self-defence, which is the use of force by a state to repel an attacker
before an actual attack has taken place, before the army of the enemy
has crossed its border, and before the bombs of the enemy fall upon
its territory. 7 "Anticipatory" is a term that "refers to the ability to
foresee consequences of some future action and take measures aimed
at checking or countering those consequences. ' 8 Part I of this article
deals with the question of whether Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
which explicitly refers to the right of self-defence in armed conflict,
substitutes the customary international law of self-defence. This
article will argue that Article 51 leaves the customary right of self-
defence unimpaired. Part II states that anticipatory self-defence is
just one of the many forms of self-defence, and that it is legitimate to
Collective Self-Defence Under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L
L. 783, 793 (1948) (arguing that obligatory reporting required by the U.N. Security
Council discourages the exercise of the right of self-defence).
14. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 138 (noting that the
Covenant was the first significant break from thejus ad bellum of traditional law).
15. See id. at 131-32 (defining the bellum justum doctrine as the theory that the
international community could regard violence as self-defence under certain
circumstances).
16. See TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW -
THE ISRAELI RAID ON THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR 119 (1996) (noting that self-
defence holds the unique status as the only ongoing exception for a state's
unilateral use of force).
17. See Michael Franklin Lohr, Legal Analysis of US Military Responses to
State-Sponsored International Terrorism, 34 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 16 (1985)
(explaining that a state may only employ anticipatory self-defence when "the
evidence of a threat is compelling and the necessity to act is overwhelming").
18. Christopher C. Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend, Anticipatory Humanitarian




expect a state to use force in anticipation of armed attack. Part III
looks at reports and judgments of U.N. authorities, which explicitly
recognize that states have the right to use pre-emptive force. Finally,
Part IV will present the conditions under which international law will
accept the plea of anticipatory self-defence.
I. ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER PRESCRIBES
CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF A PRE-EXISTING,
INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE, RECOGNIZED IN
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
As a fundamental "Principle of the Organization" and a general
principle of international law, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter
requires that states refrain from the use of force, and states that "[a]ll
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity and political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations." 9 However, one must consider
the prohibition of the use of force under the U.N. Charter in light of
other relevant provisions. In Article 42, the U.N. Charter states that
the "Security Council may take military enforcement measures in
conformity with Chapter VII.' ' 2° Article 51 envisages a further lawful
use of force in the even of an armed attack:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
2 1
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its 18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 247,
art. 49, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (stating that the majority view is that
Article 2(4) reflects the modern customary law regarding the use of force).
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 244, (July 8), para. 38 (stating that the "Charter recognizes
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The question in relation to anticipatory self-defence is, therefore,
whether Article 51 of the U.N. Charter has become the only source
of a state's right of self-defence in international law (and, therefore,
one is limited to considering whether Article 51 permits anticipatory
self-defence), or whether Article 51 only imposes certain conditions
for the application of a pre-existing, inherent right of self-defence
(where one would consider, in addition to Article 51, customary
international law).22 For the reasons that follow, this article maintains
that Article 51 "only highlights one form of self-defence (namely in
response to an armed attack)," and that the right of self-defence is a
pre-existing, inherent right recognized in customary international
law.23
the inherent right of the individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs."); MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 119 (stating that the "right of self-
defence is the only ongoing exception for a state's unilateral resort to the use of
force explicitly recognised by the Charter"). Under Articles 10 and 11 of the U.N.
Charter, the General Assembly has the power to "recommend" enforcement action.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-11. Articles 52 and 53 of Chapter VIII grant regional
agencies certain power in matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security. Id. arts. 52-53. However, enforcement action by such agencies
can only be undertaken with the prior authority of the Security Council. Id. Article
107 of Chapter XVII allowed Members to take unilateral action against any of the
Axis Powers of World War II in the interim between the signing of the Charter and
the establishment of the Organisation. Id. art. 107. Although this Article does not
explicitly mention the Security Council or its primary authority, that authority is
implicit because the provisions would be redundant as soon as the Security Council
was in operation.
22. See Joyner & Arend, supra note 18, at 35 (commenting that there was "no
clear consensus among Council members that Article 51 limited the right to self-
defence to circumstances which an actual armed attack had already occurred").
23. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, 167
(Cambridge University Press 3d ed. 2001); see also Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary
D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense: the United Nations' Emerging
Role, 45 NAVAL L. REv. 217, 234 (1998) (arguing that the customary right of
anticipatory self-defence should stand). Contra George K. Walker, Anticipatory
Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said, 31
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 352 (1998) (noting that collective self-defence may occur
even without a treaty).
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A. THE CHARTER'S DRAFTERS DID NOT INTEND TO RESTRICT
BROADER NOTIONS OF TRADITIONAL SELF-DEFENCE
First, the drafting history of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter makes
it clear that this Article only refers to a pre-existing, inherent right of
self-defence under customary international law. As mentioned in the
introduction, approximately seventy years ago, international law
reached a position where it could outlaw war as an instrument of
international policy.2 4 This was reflected in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact and repeated in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.25 However, the
right of individual self-defence was regarded as so firmly established
in international law that it was automatically excepted from the
Kellogg-Briand Pact without any mention of it.26 When negotiating
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United States sent a series of identical
notes to a number of other governments inviting them to become
parties to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and stating that:
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which
restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defence. That right is
inherent in every sovereign [s]tate and is implicit in every treaty. Every
nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its
territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide
whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defence.
27
The 1948 Tokyo Judgment, which reads that "[a]ny law,
international or municipal, which prohibits recourse to force, is
24. See Ago, supra note 11, at 52, para. 83 (noting that self-defence is an
"exceptional circumstance").
25. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (stating that "[a]ll Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations"); see also Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra
note 12, at art. 1 (condemning "recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies").
26. See Lohr, supra note 17, at 17 (commenting on the U.S. note, which firmly
established the right to self-defence, so that an express reservation was not
required).
27. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 164 (arguing that self-defence is inherent
in the "sovereignty of states"); see also Wright, supra note 12, at 42-44 (noting that
critics have argued the notes reveal the negotiators' intent to interpret the treaty as
a domestic question, departing from established international law).
20031
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necessarily limited by the right of self-defence,"2 further affirms this
idea.
The principle of automatically excepting acts of self-defence from
international legal instruments addressing armed aggression would
have been true in the U.N. Charter if there had been no Article 51, as
indeed there was not in the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.29
U.N. Members inserted Article 51 of the U.N. Charter not for the
purpose of defining the individual right of self-defence, but for the
purpose of clarifying the position in regard to collective
understandings for mutual self-defence.3" There was concern among
the delegates to the San Francisco Conference that the U.N. Charter
might affect the Pan-American treaty, known as the Act of
Chapultepec, signed by all the American republics on March 8, 1945
(one month before the San Francisco Conference) declaring that
aggression against one American State would be considered an act of
aggression against all.3' The U.N. Members drafted Article 51 to
clarify this issue, and, with regard to defence against external
aggression, it was natural for Article 51 to be related to collective
defence against armed "attack. 3 2 The delegates originally considered
28. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Nov.
1948) reprinted in 101 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL 48494 (R. John
Pritchard ed., 1998).
29. See Verbatim Minutes of the Fourth Plenary Session, April 28, U.N. Doc.
24 (1945), reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, APRIL 25 TO JUNE 26, 1945,
SELECTED DOCUMENTS 313 (1946) (stating that the Dumbarton Oaks proposal was
merely a framework that is open for improvement).
30. See id. at 313 (acknowledging the need for organized coercive action).
31. See id. at 312 (noting that Uruguay follows the principle behind the Act of
Chapultepec).
32. See id. (expressing hope that the agreement will protect the principle of
self-defence); see also Verbatim Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Session, April 30,
U.N. Doc. 42 (1945), reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, APRIL 25 TO JUNE
26, 1945, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 329-330 (commenting on the defects in the
Security Council's voting procedures); Report of June 8 of Rapporteur of
Subcommittee III/4/A to Committee 111/4 on the Amalgamation of Amendments,
U.N. Doc. 854 (1945), reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, APRIL 25 TO JUNE
26, 1945, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 779 (discussing the insertion of text into the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals); Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission
[19:69
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placing Article 51 in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter, which would
limited the right of collective self-defence to regional organizations
and would have required prior approval by the U.N. Security Council
to exercise the right of self-defence.33
In the ensuing debate, the delegates clearly intended for the
customary right of self-defence to be unaltered and sought to prevent
a single permanent member of the U.N. Security Council from being
able to prevent a regional organization from taking any action by
using its veto power.34 As a result, the delegates placed Article 51 in
Chapter VII.35 Moreover, the relevant San Francisco Conference
Report that considered Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter contains the
statement that "[t]he use of arms in legitimate self-defence remains
admitted and unimpaired. 3 6 Senator Vandenberg, a member of the
U.S. Delegation, declared that "we here recognize the inherent right
of self-defence, whether individual or collective, which permits any
sovereign state among us or any qualified regional group of states to
ward off attack pending adequate action by the parent body."37
III on June 13, U.N. Docs. 972, 1078 & 1198 (1945), reprinted in THE UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, SAN FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA, APRIL 25 TO JUNE 26, 1945, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 783-790 (setting
forth the discussion leading to the report's unanimous approval); Josef L. Kunz,
Individual and Collective Self-Defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 873 (1947) (noting that the session distinguished
between armed attack and other acts of aggression). See generally Claud H.M.
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International
Law, 1952 II RECUEIL DES COURS 451, 496-97 (discussing Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter).
33. See RICHARD J. ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST
STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 140-41 (1989) (explaining the
origins and significance of Article 51).
34. See D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (1958)
(noting the fear that a single permanent Member's veto could prevent action by the
regional organisation).
35. See ERICKSON, supra note 33, 140-41 (noting the eventual placement of
Article 51).
36. Report of June 13 of Rapporteur of Committee I/I to Commission I, U.N.
Doc. 944 (1945), reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, APRIL 25 TO JUNE
26, 1945, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 490, 498.
37. Verbatim Minutes of Second Meeting of Commission III on June 13, U.N.
Docs. 972, 1078, & 1198 (1945 ) reprinted in THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
2003]
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Article 51 therefore leaves unimpaired the right of self-defence as it
existed prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter.38
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE 51 DOES NOT SEEK TO
RESTRICT BROADER NOTIONS OF SELF-DEFENCE
However, it is not the drafting history alone that makes clear that
Article 51 refers to a pre-existing right.39 The wording of Article 51
also supports the position that the U.N. Charter preserves the
customary international law concept of self-defence.4" Article 51
explicitly acknowledges the. pre-existing customary right of self-
defence, as recognized by the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") 4
and the U.N. Security Council,42 by stating that "nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence."43 The word "inherent" - mistranslated into
French by the term "droit naturel" (with its undesirable connotations
of the natural law theory of the fundamental rights of states)," and
better reflected in Spanish by the term "derecho inmanente" and in
Russian by "neotemlemoe pravo" (indefeasible right) - was used in
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, APRIL 25 TO
JUNE 26, 1945, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 785.
* 38. See Report of the Committee on Use of Force in Relations Among States,
1985-86 AM BRANCH OF THE INT'L LAW ASS'N 188, 203 (interpreting Article 51 as
leaving the right to self-defence unimpaired).
39. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J 14, 94
(June 27) (noting the text's reference to a pre-existing right).
40. See id. (stating that the right of self-defence has a customary nature); id. at
102 (commenting that the resolution shows that self-defence is a matter of
customary international law).
41. See id. (noting that the treaty refers to "pre-existing customary international
law").
42. See S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/368
(2001) ("Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in
accordance with the Charter."); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) ("Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence as recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as
reiterated in resolution 1368.").
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
44. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 163 (2001) (noting that "[a]t the present




the United States note during the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact.45 It is intended primarily to emphasize that the ability to make
an exception to the prohibition on the use of force for the purpose of
lawful self-defence against an armed attack is a prerogative of every
sovereign state.46 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter explicitly recognizes
this inherent right, and prescribes some conditions for its legitimate
exercise.47
The U.N. Charter, having recognized the existence of the inherent
right of self-defence, does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of
its content.48 The preconditions under Article 51 for the exercise of
the inherent right are too vague to assume that the architects of
Article 51 intended to substitute the customary right of self-defence
with a statutory one.49 For instance, there are no other references to
other preconditions of the right of self-defence, such as the nature of
the rights a state is entitled to protect with force °.5 Article 51 does not
explain the intended scope of the phrase "if an armed attack
occurs."5' Therefore, various questions may arise "because of the
45. See Verbatim Minutes of the Fourth Plenary Session, supra note 29
(discussing notes related to negotiation).
46. See Lohr, supra note 17, at 17 (commenting on the U.S. notes).
47. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
102-03 (June 27) (setting forth the exceptions to the prohibition of force).
48. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, 120-21 (commenting that Article 51 is
silent as to what constitutes the preconditions for a legitimate exercise of self-
defence and as to what constitutes a permissible amount of force).
49. See Myres S. McDougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defence,
57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 599-600 (claiming that the purpose of the broad language
of Article 51 was to accommodate regional organisations rather than restrict the
customary right of self-defence).
50. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 120 (arguing that Article 51 does not
specifically address the preconditions for a legitimate exercise of self-defence).
51. See G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/3314
(XXIX) (1975) (providing a definition of aggression); see also Military and
Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J at 94, 103 (noting the text's reference to a pre-
existing right and that the definition of aggression may be taken to reflect
customary international law). However, under the heading of acts of aggression,
the Definition includes acts that do not necessarily all qualify as "armed attacks."
Id.; see also G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/2625
(XXIV) (1970) (requiring all states to comply in good faith with their obligations
under the rules of international law with respect to international peace and
security).
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particular 'object' against which the armed attack was directed or
because of the 'subjects' that carried it out."52 Finally, Article 51 is
silent about the amount of force permitted in a legitimate exercise of
self-defence 3.5  This silence demonstrates that in the field of self-
defence, customary international law continues to exist alongside
treaty law. 4
Article 51 is therefore only meaningful on the basis that there is a
"customary" or "inherent" right of self-defence. 5 Article 51 sets
certain conditions and refers further to the principle contained in
customary international law to respond unilaterally (perhaps in
association with other states) with lawful force to unlawful force.56
The next question is, therefore, whether this customary right of self-
defence "is also accorded to [s]tates as a preventive measure (taken
in 'anticipation' of an armed attack, and not merely in response to an
attack that has actually occurred)."57
II. THE PRESCRIBED RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE DOES
NOT EXCLUDE THE RIGHT TO TAKE ANTICIPATORY
ACTION
Two schools of thought exist regarding anticipatory self-defence
in international law.5 First, the restrictive school argues for a narrow
52. Ago, supra note 11, at 68, para. 117. See generally, Nicar. v. U.S., 1986
I.C.J 14 (examining the issues surrounding the subjects that carried out the armed
attack).
53. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 120 (noting that Article 51 fails to
define an appropriate amount of force).
54. See, e.g., McDougal, supra note 49, at 600 (observing that the customary
right of self-defence is consistent with the purposes of the United Nations).
55. See Lohr, supra note 17, at 18 (arguing that the negotiating history of
Article 51 reveals the intention of incorporating the entire customary law).
56. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.").
57. DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 165-66 (arguing that Article 51 deliberately
restricts the right of self-defence to a response to an armed attack),
58. See ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 136-41 (discussing the differing




interpretation of self-defence, excluding anticipatory self-defence.
These scholars refer to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and to
customary international law and assert that there is no right of self-
defence absent an armed attack. 9 In the event of a possible attack
"[a] state can meet preparations for attack only by preparations to
resist."6 A state can also bring the matter to the attention of the U.N.
Security Council.
61
59. See, e.g., Josef L. Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article
51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947)
(arguing that Article 51 prohibits preventative war); PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN
LAW OF NATIONS 166 (1948) ("Under the Charter, alarming military preparations
by a neighboring state would justify a resort to the Security Council, but would not
justify resort to anticipatory force by the state which believed itself threatened.");
Wehberg, supra note 2, 81-82 (1951) (describing the exception for individual or
collective self-defence under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as "substantially
limited," and indicating that parties may not invoke the exception except in cases
of "armed aggression," and not simply in cases of threat of aggression); HANS
KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (1952) (describing Article 51 as
restricting the right of self-defence to instances when armed attacks against
members of the United Nations occur until the time the Security Council
intervenes); Ian Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 1961 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 183, 244 (asserting that Article 51 does not permit anticipatory action and
that arguments that claim otherwise are not convincing); Quincy Wright, The
Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 560 (1963) (noting that other
provisions of the U.N. Charter require states to submit disputes to the United
Nations and to refrain from use of unilateral force); K. Skubiszewski, Use of Force
by States. Collective Security. Law of War and Neutrality., in MANUAL OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 767 (Max Sorensen ed., St. Martin's Press 1968) (noting that
the Charter introduces a new approach to self-defence in that it only offers
protection against the illegal use of force and not against violations of the
fundamental rights of states); DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 166-69 (promoting the
strict interpretation of Article 51); Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by
Attacking the Perpetrators or Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense:
Human Rights Versus the State's Duty to Protect its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 195, 213 (2001) (asserting that the wording of Article 51 requires an
armed attack using weapons and that mere threats or declarations are insufficient);
Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 547
(2002) (claiming that arguments that the Charter permits anticipatory self-defence
are unpersuasive).
60. ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 136.
61. See JESSUP, supra note 59, at 166 (arguing that under the U.N. Charter,
military preparations by a neighboring state would warrant resorting to the U.N.
Security Council, but would not justify resorting to anticipatory force).
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However, a significant number of publicists have supported the
view that the customary right of self-defence includes the use of
force in anticipation of an attack in certain circumstances.62
According to the expansive theory, this customary right of
anticipatory self-defence survives under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.63 This article proposes that the restrictive school is incorrect,
62. See ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 138 (listing the members 0f the expansive
school of thought who interpret Article 51 as permitting anticipatory self-defence
in response to imminent armed attack)
63. See, e.g., Claud H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law, in RECUEIL DES COURS II , 451, 496-97
(1952) (arguing that Article 51 does not limit the customary right of self-defence to
situations of resistance to armed attacks); D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-92 (Manchester University Press 1958) (asserting that
Article 51 does not preclude actions taken against an imminent danger);
MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 232-41 (noting that the preparatory
work on the U.N. Charter indicates that U.N. Members did not draft Article 51 for
the purpose of narrowing the scope of customary law regarding self-defence);
W.T. Mallison, Jr., Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National
and Collective Defence Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 335, 362-63 (1962-1963) (proposing that construing Article 51 as allowing
for anticipatory self-defence is both more consistent with public policy and with
the preparatory work of the U.N. Charter); D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
317-318 (Stevens & Sons 2d ed. 1970) (observing that debates during and after the
adoption of the U.N. Charter indicate that member nations did not read Article 51
to exclude anticipatory action); Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to
Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1.,.4 (1972) (noting that anticipatory self-defence
is necessary and practiced in today's world); Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-
Defense in International Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, -59
N.Y.U.L. REV. 187, 201-02 (1984) (asserting that because the U.N. Charter is
silent on the issue of defensive use of anticipatory force, a presumption that pre-
emptive attacks are permitted exists); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use
Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1633-35 (1984) (suggesting that it is
erroneous to read Article 51 as completely excluding anticipatory self-defence
because it is unclear whether Article 51 intended to eliminate the customary right
of self-defence); Lohr, supra note 17, at 18 (noting that the negotiating history of
Article 51 supports the contention that the inherent right to self-defence includes
reasonable and necessary anticipatory self-defence); Uri Shoham, The Grenada
Intervention: The Israeli Aerial Raid upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Right
of Self-Defense, 109 MIL. L. REV. 191, 198 (1985) (concluding that the right of
preventative self-defence under customary law is necessary in the age of nuclear
weapons); Report of the Committee on Use of Force in Relations Among States,
supra note 38, at 203-04 (arguing that because it is not clear that the purpose of
Article 51 was to eliminate the customary right of self-defence, it should not be
given that effect); Antonio Cassese, Return to Westphalia? Considerations on the
Gradual Erosion of the Charter System, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATIONS OF
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENCE
THE USE OF FORCE 509, 516 (A. Cassese ed., 1986) (arguing that strict
interpretation of the right to anticipatory action is essential and considering the
consequences if a state were to abuse such a right); Oscar Schachter, In Defense of
International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 135-36 (1986)
(noting the necessity of pre-emptive force when an attack is immediate and
massive); Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects
of the Use of Force, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATIONS OF THE USE OF FORCE
435, 442 (A. Cassese ed.,1986) (commenting that there are certain circumstances
that allow a state to take pre-emptive military action in self-defence); Higgins,
supra note 63, 299-302 (maintaining that a state may use anticipatory force if the
state is threatened by border raids or harassing restrictions to trade by other
nationals or governments); Louis Rene Beres, On International Law and Nuclear
Terrorism, 24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 32 (1994) [hereinafter On International
Law] (arguing that a narrow interpretation of Article 51 ignores the fact that
international law cannot force a state to withstand a devastating first strike before
taking preventative action); Louis Rene Beres, Reconsidering Israel's Destruction
of Iraq's Osiraq Nuclear Reactor, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 437, 438 (1995)
(declaring that the right of anticipatory self-defence is especially compelling in
today's age of mass destruction weaponry); Louis Rene Beres, A Rejoinder, 9
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 445-49 (1995) [hereinafter A Rejoinder] (discussing
Israel's right to destroy an Iraqi nuclear reactor in anticipatory self-defence); Louis
Rene Beres, Israel, Lebanon, and Hizbullah: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 14
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 149-50 (1997) (noting Israel's right of pre-emptive
self-defence against terrorist attacks is assured both by Article 51 and the
customary right of anticipatory self-defence); Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary D.
Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense: The United Nations' Emerging
Role, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 217, 228 (1998) (commenting that to justify anticipatory
self-defence an imminent, not remote nor constructive threat, must exist); James C.
Duncan, A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, 45 NAVAL L. REV.
1, 45-47 (1998) (stating the three necessary criteria which must be met in order for
a state to engage in anticipatory self-defence as imminence, necessity, and
proportionality); Louis Rene Beres, Implications of a Palestinian State for Israeli
Security and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 229,
283 (1999) (noting that the U.N. Security Council implicitly approved of Israel's
pre-emptive attacks against Arab states in 1967); John-Alex Romano, Note,
Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the Doctrine of
a State of Necessity, 87 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1036 (1999) (maintaining that the
argument that Article 51 permits some form of anticipatory action is more
reasonable than the contention that it does not, especially when pre-emptive action
is essential for self-preservation); Joyner & Arend, supra note 18, at 34-35 (noting
that debates within the U.N. Security Council provide no consensus as to whether
Article 51 limits the right to self-defence to situations when an actual attack
occurs); George K. Walker, Information Warfare and Neutrality, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1079, 1123 (2000) (asserting that because the right of anticipatory
self-defence existed before the Charter era and because mutual defence treaties
have continued to provide for anticipatory self-defence, the right still exists in
international law); McDougal, supra note 49, 599-601 (arguing that there is no
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and that the right to engage in anticipatory self-defence comports
with the more accurate interpretation of the customary right of self-
defence and of Article 51.
I A. THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 51
First, the restrictive school has a textual argument. Proponents
argue that "[t]here is not the slightest indication in Article 51 that the
occurrence of an 'armed attack' represents only one set of
circumstances (among others) in which self-defence may be
exercised." 6 The restrictionists maintain that there is no point in
stating the obvious (i.e., that an "armed attack" gives rise to the right
of self-defence), while omitting a reference to the ambiguous (i.e.,
that Article 51 allows self-defence as an anticipatory measure).65
Anticipatory self-defence, if legitimate under the U.N. Charter,
"would require regulation by lex scripta more acutely than a
response to an armed attack, since the opportunities for abuse are
incomparably greater. 6 6 Moreover, Article 51 not only fails to
intimate that anticipatory self-defence is allowed, it even restricts the
critical task assigned to the U.N. Security Council to the exclusive
setting of counter-force employed in response to an armed attack.67 If
an anticipatory self-defence war was justified, "it ought to be
exposed to no less - if possible, even closer - supervision by the
Council."68
Article 51, however, reads that "nothing in the present U.N.
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence. '69 As mentioned above, the drafting history and the wording
of Article 51 reflect the intention of the architects of the U.N. Charter
evidence to support the contention that the framers of the U.N. Charter intended to
impose new limits upon the traditional right of self-defence).
64. DINSTEIN, supra note 23.
65. See id. (questioning the reasoning behind stating that armed attack evinces
the right of self-defence while neglecting to reference the ambiguous conditions of
preventive war).
66. Id.
67. See id. (stating that Article 51 does not address whether preventive war is
allowable and restricts the U.N. Security Council's role).
68. Id.
69. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
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to refer in Article 51 to a pre-existing, inherent right of self-
defence.70 No argument can therefore be drawn from the wording "if
an armed attack occurs" in Article 5 1.71 Moreover, relying upon that
phrase alone does not lead to the conclusion that armed attack is a
necessary prerequisite to self-defence:
[a] proposition that "if A, then B," is not equivalent to, and does not
necessarily imply, the proposition that "if, and only if A, then B." To read
one proposition for the other, or to imply the latter form the former, may
be the result of a policy choice, conscious or otherwise ... such
identification or implication is assuredly not a compulsion of logic.
72
Further, "where there is convincing evidence not merely of threats
of force and potential danger but of an attack actually being
mounted, then an armed attack may be said to have begun to occur,
though it has not passed the frontier. '7 3 Reading "if an armed attack
occurs" as "after an armed attack has occurred" goes beyond the
necessary meaning of the words. 74 Finally, Article 2(4) of the Charter
requires Members to refrain not only from the use of force, but also
from the threat of force.75 If states had to wait for an armed attack to
occur, then maintenance of international peace and security could not
70. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (arguing that the drafting history
of Article 51 does not indicate that its purpose was to limit the customary right of
anticipatory self-defence).
71. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 234 (arguing that the words
of Article 51 do not have any clear, unambiguous, or predetermined meaning); see
also KELSEN, supra note 13 (observing that the U.N. Charter does not define
"armed attack"). The interpretation of the phrase is left to the states involved in the
conflict. Id.
72. MCDOOGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 237 n.261 (emphasis in
original).
73. Waldock, supra note 32, at 498 (noting that an imminent threat exists when
a country mounts an attack, thus implying a right to self-defence).
74. Waldock, supra note 32, at 497-98 (noting one authority, Sir Erick Beckett,
who has interpreted the phrase to mean after an armed attack occurs).
75. See Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
1996 I.C.J, 222, 246-47 (declaring that if a country possessed nuclear weapons and
threatened the integrity of a state or the purposes of the United Nations with such
weapons, the country would violate the U.N. Charter).
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take place.76 If states waited for such an attack, they would then
become responsible for the restoration, instead of maintenance, of
international peace and security. 77
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF THE RESTRICTIVE SCHOOL
The restrictionists have put forward additional policy reasons
against anticipatory self-defence." They argue that "determining
with certainty that an armed attack is imminent is extremely
difficult," because any error in judgment could lead to an
unwarranted and unnecessary conflict.79 In many cases, government
leaders will make aggressive statements without harbouring any
actual intent to attack.80 This form of posturing could have dangerous
results:
The Soviet Union and the United States each drew up contingency plans
to attack the other, and each made negative statements about the other. In
these circumstances, intentions may be misunderstood. Soviet premier
Nikita Khrushchev at one point made the statement, "We shall bury you."
This statement was intended by Khrushchev as a prediction that socialism
would outlast capitalism, but it was widely misconstrued (either
innocently or intentionally) as an expression of intent to destroy the
United States by force of arms.
81
76. See, e.g., ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 139 (noting that Article 51
contemplates the maintenance of international peace and security by allowing for
anticipatory self-defence); Polebaum, supra note 63, at 228 (arguing that pre-
emptive attacks are necessary because of the potential for total destruction in the
age of nuclear weapons); Waldock, supra note 32, at 498 (arguing that compelling
a state to allow its aggressor to strike the first blow is especially lethal in the era of
atomic warfare).
77. See ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 139 (observing that states would be unable
to maintain international peace and security if they were forced to wait for an
armed attack to occur).
78. See id. at 138 (providing several policy reasons why the rules of
international law should not permit anticipatory self-defence).
79. Id.
80. See John Quigley, A Weak Defense of Anticipatory Self-Defence, 10 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 255, 257 (1996) (discussing international posturing).
81. Id. at 257.
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However, it does not follow logically from the possibility of
mistake that there should be a limit to the right of self-defence. States
who engage in an anticipatory action will do so at high cost, and will,
out of self-interest, consider other options to avoid recourse to
force. s2
C. PRETEXT CONCERNS
The restrictive school also anticipates that a government could
deliberately portray its adversary as being positioned to attack to gain
carte blanche for aggression under the flag of anticipatory self-
defence. 3 A "jurisprudentially creative nation can use the right of
self-defence to justify virtually any aggressive action."84
In response, acts of self-defence should always be subject to
international investigation and control. 5 Moreover, the possibility of
abuse is not a sufficient reason to discount the existence of the
right.86
D. DANGER OF AMBIGUITY
Further, an expansionist notion of self-defence, including
anticipatory action, is alleged to be a danger to international order.
"In a world that is hard pressed to stop aggressive war," customary
82. See generally Romana Sadurska, Threats of Force, 82 AM. J. INT'L L., 239,
239-68 (1988) (relaying the three different functions of threats in the international
community). A threat may operate as a notice of the likelihood of a sanction, it
may be an attempt to hasten the resolution of a dispute by non-forcible measures,
or it may act as a substitute for violence. Id.
83. See id. (explaining the strategic considerations involved in feigning self-
defence).
84. Clemmons & Brown, supra note 23, at 223.
85. See Waldock, supra note 32, at 496 (commenting that for the right of self-
defence to function as more than just an excuse for aggression, the right must be
subject to international scrutiny).
86. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 120 (asserting that the primary
argument against anticipatory self-defence, abuse of the right, is insufficient to
discount the right).
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law provides no clear guidelines for application.87 "Concepts such as
'force,' 'threat of force,' or 'political independence' embrace a wide
range of possible meanings."88 This customary law of anticipatory
self-defence might just be "too fraught with danger for the basic
policy of peace and stability." 9
There are, however, no clear and precise guidelines for "self-
defence in general" either.90 It is clear that once one argues for the
existence of the right of anticipatory self-defence, one needs "a clear
statement of the legal limits so that any purported exercise of the
right is capable of legal evaluation and not just a matter for the 'self-
judgment' of the 'defending' state." 91 Part IV of this article will
provide further explanation of these limits. Moreover, the absence of
a clear definition of a right cannot be used as an argument denying
the existence of a right.
E. BALLISTIC MISSILE CONCERNS
Finally, those who state that there can be no right of anticipatory
self-defence argue that "the existence of nuclear missiles has made it
even more important to maintain a legal barrier against pre-emptive
strikes and anticipatory defence."92 Others, even some members of
the restrictive school, see the advent of modem weapons of mass
destruction as an exception. The fear that nuclear missiles could, on
the first strike, destroy the capability for defence and allow virtually
87. Quigley, supra note 80, at 257; see also ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 138
(explaining that customary law provides no clear guidance on the application of
this principle).
88. Report of the Committee on Use of Force in Relations Among States, supra
note 38, at 201.
89. Rosalyn Higgins, The Legal Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States
United Nations Practice, 1961, BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 269, 302.
90. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 111-12 (noting how the U.N. Charter's
provisions regarding self-defence have several different interpretations).
91. Id.
92. Report of the Committee on Use of Force in Relations Among States, supra
note 38, at 203; see also Wehberg, supra note 2, at 82 (stating that, in light of
recent developments in atomic armament, it is impossible to maintain the view that
parties can evade Article 51's prohibition against the use of force by invoking
classic international law's admission of a legitimate right to self-defence against a
simple threat of aggression).
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no time for defence has appeared to many to render a requirement of
armed attack unreasonable.93 A scholar suggested that "it would be
reasonable to put an interception system into operation against a
rocket approaching through airspace over the high seas, the airspace
of third states, or through Outer Space."94 If the state that launched
the rocket has frontiers contiguous with the state threatened, the
preventive measures may be taken over the territory of the putative
aggressor.95
The restrictive school would argue that "[s]uch relaxation should
only be allowed in the case of rockets in flight: if it is extended to
fast aircraft and other instruments the possibilities of abuse of the
law increase. 96 The more generally accepted point of view is that to
wait for the first strike would be insanity when military preparation
is inadequate as a deterrence or as a shock absorber.97 A narrow
reading of the right of self-defence would only protect the
aggressor's right to the first strike.9 One of the purposes of
international law is to prevent acts of aggression, not foster them.99
93. See On International Law, supra note 63, at 32 (arguing that international
law cannot force a state to wait to absorb devastating strikes before taking
protective measures).
94. See Brownlie, supra note 59, at 259 (explaining that in certain cases the
means of countering the aggression will be inadequate to ensure protection if
action is only taken once an object of aggression enters the territory of the
threatened state).
95. See id. (noting that such action is justified even if the rocket was launched
without authority or by mistake).
96. Id.
97. See On International Law, supra note 63, at 32 (suggesting that waiting for
a nuclear attack is the equivalent of accepting annihilation); A Rejoinder, supra
note 63, at 445-46 (noting that the argument for anticipatory self-defence has
strengthened in the nuclear age); DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 184 (suggesting that
in Article 51 the occurrence of an armed attack represents only one set of
circumstances in which a state may exercise self-defence); Mark E. Newcomb,
Non-Proliferation, Self-Defenee, and the Korean Crisis, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L.
L. 603, 620 (1994) (explaining that advances in weapons technology have altered
the imminence requirement of self-defence).
98. See ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 142-43 (1989) (explaining that a narrow
reading of the U.N. Charter does not permit anticipatory self-defence).
99. See id. at 143 (stating the purpose of the U.N. Charter).
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Anticipatory self-defence should therefore be considered as a part
of the more general right of self-defence under customary
international law, recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 100
Moreover, in recent years, although some authoritative bodies of the
United Nations have had the opportunity to dismiss anticipatory self-
defence in favor of a more restrictive interpretation, they have not
done so.' 01
III. GUIDANCE BY UNITED NATIONS AUTHORITIES
ABOUT THE RIGHT OF ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENCE
Organs of the United Nations considered, on three occasions,
whether force was permitted in anticipation of an attack."2
100. See id. at 138-39 (explaining how anticipatory self-defence is consistent
with article 51 of the U.N. Charter).
101. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 140 (referring to Roberto Ago's
submission to the International Law Commission on state responsibility and the
ICJ judgment on the Nicaragua case).
102. There is also discussion in the literature about the Corfu Channel case.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 77 (April 9); Waldock, supra note
32, at 451. Professor Claud H.M. Waldock stated that in so far as the ICJ
considered that strong force - amounting to a demonstration of force by sending
two cruisers and two destroyers of the Royal Navy with their crews at action
stations on October 22, 1946 through the Corfu Channel - is legitimate to ensure
the safe exercise of the right of passage which has been illegally denied, "the Court
did not take a narrow view of the inherent right [of self-defence] reserved by
Article 51." Id. According to Waldock, the Court apparently allowed a
demonstration of force not merely for insuring safe exercise of the right of passage
but to test the attitude of Albania and to coerce it into future good-behavior. Id.
However, there is no firm support for Waldock's view in the Judgment. See
Brownlie, supra note 59, at 244 (arguing that Article 51 does not permit
anticipatory action). The Court was considering the general question of delictual
responsibility and had regard to all the circumstances of the case. Corfu Channel,
1949 I.C.J. at 77. It was concerned with the dominant character of the passage. Id.
And in fact there was no preventive self-defence but merely the taking of
precautions to defend the British ships in case of attack. Id. Moreover, only in two
of the Dissenting Opinions, and there merely in relation to the "operation Retail" -
the British minesweeping operation in Albanian waters on November 12 and 13,
1946, reference is made to some of the relevant Articles of the Charter. See Corfu
Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 77 (Krylov, J., dissenting) (discussing Articles 2 and 42 of
the U.N. Charter); see also id. at 252 (Ecer, J., dissenting) (declaring agreement
with Judge Krylov's dissent); George Schwarzenberger, Report on Some Aspects
of the Principle of Self-Defence in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Topics Covered by the Dubrovnik Resolution, in Report of the Forty-Eighth
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A. PRE-EMPTIVE FORCE IN ANTICIPATION OF A NUCLEAR STRIKE
The Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") suggested in its First
Report in December 1946 that preparation for atomic warfare in
breach of a multilateral treaty or convention would, in view of the
appalling power of the weapon, have to be treated as an "armed
attack" within Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.103 More specifically,
the AEC made the following recommendations to the Security
Council about the control of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons:
"[T]he development and use of atomic energy are not essentially
matters of domestic concern of the individual nations, but rather have
predominantly international implications and repercussions."'' 0 4 An
"effective system for the control of atomic energy must be
international, and must be established by an enforceable multilateral
treaty or convention which in turn must be administered and operated
by an international organ or agency within the United Nations.' 0 5
When a state violates the terms of this multilateral treaty or
convention, the AEC stated that "it should.., be borne in mind that
a violation might be so grave a character as to give rise to the
inherent right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of the Charter
of the United Nations."'0 6 This statement implies that the AEC
recognized a right of anticipatory self-defence.
The representative of the United States made the importance of
self-defence clear in a memorandum, submitted in response to a
request of the Chairman of the AEC. The memorandum read that it is
impossible to treat atomic energy and atomic weapons without
reference to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. According to the
Conference Held at New York, 1958 INT'L. L. ASS'N. 550, 572 & 585 (explaining
that the Dissenting Opinions criticized the majority Judgment for failing to
mention provisions of the U.N. Charter); BOWETT, supra note 34, at 189-90
(noting that the ICJ did not make any statements regarding the right to self-defence
as related to articles of the U.N. Charter).
103. See Waldock, supra note 32, at 498 (recounting the Atomic Energy
Commission's suggestions to the U.N. Security Council).
104. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY: THE FIRST REPORT OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
19 (U.S. & U.N. Report Series No. 8, 1946).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 22.
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representative of the United States, it was clear that an armed attack
under Article 51:
is now something entirely different from what it was prior to the
discovery of atomic weapons. It would therefore seem to be both
important and appropriate under present conditions that the treaty define
'armed attack' in a manner appropriate to atomic weapons and include in
the definition not simply the actual dropping of an atomicbomb, but also
certain steps in themselves preliminary to such action.
1 0 7
B. UNDECLARED CONSENSUS?
In 1980, Roberto Ago, the Special Rapporteur to the International
Law Commission ("ILC"), presented the final section of his report
on State Responsibility. 108 This final section dealt with the issues of
"state of necessity" and "self-defence."'0 9 In. the course of his
discussion on self-defence, Ago rejected the notion of the "right" of
self-defence. °10 "Self-defence" is an expression that connotes a
situation or de facto condition, not a subjective "right." '
Considering the different interpretations of Article 51 and in
reference to the argument for anticipatory self-defence, Ago argued
that the majority of the publicists who have written about self-
defence by no means share the opinion that anticipatory self-defence
is legitimate. 2 Ago clearly favoured the view that the theses of the
advocates of the school of anticipatory self-defence have been
"rejected one by one."1' 3
107. The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 2d Sess., Special Supp., Annex 4, at 109-10, U.N. Doc.
5/Supplements (1946).
108. Ago, supra note 11.
109. See id. at 13 (stating the contents of the report).
110. See id. at 53, para. 87 (explaining that the right to self-defence is conceded
to a state under certain conditions rather than as a fundamental right of a state).
111. See id. (explaining that a state is in a position to use self-defence only when
exonerated from the duty to refrain from the use of force because of an aggressor).
112. See id. at 66-67, para. 114 (questioning the legitimacy of anticipatory self-
defence).
113. See id. at 65-66, para. 113 (stating that his opinions diverge from the views
of writers who support the legitimacy of anticipatory self-defence).
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However, Ago goes on to state that it is not for the ILC "to settle
some highly controversial problems arising, in doctrine and in United
Nations practice, in connection with the interpretation and the
wording of Article 51 of the Charter."'" 4 Instead, his recommended
provision on self-defence renders the interpretation of Article 51
uncertain. 1 5 "If the case against anticipatory self-defence really is a
closed one, why not say that and have the International Law
Commission approve the restrictive interpretation as a formal
decision?""'16
C. NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES
In the 1986 Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that "[i]n the case of
individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the
[s]tate concerned having been the victim of an armed attack."' ' This
is an apparently unambiguous statement on the scope of the right of
self-defence in customary international law." 8 However, from the
context of the paragraph in which this statement appears, and from
the paragraphs immediately preceding this statement, one can argue
that the ICJ was not making a judgment here about whether an armed
114. See Ago, supra note 11, at 5-7 (explaining that the function of the
International Law Commission is to codify international law, not settle doctrinal
issues).
115. See Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second
Reading, U.N. GAOR, Int'l L. Comm'n, 53rd Sess., art. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001) (providing a provision on self-defence which states
that "the wrongfulness of an act of a [s]tate is precluded if the act constitutes a
lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations."); MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 141 (explaining Ago's imprecise
provision).
116. MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 141 (suggesting that it is difficult to
explain the failure of authoritative bodies to dismiss broad interpretations of
Article 51 in light of broad dismissal of arguments in favor of anticipatory self-
defence).
117. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103
(June 27); see also Romano, supra note 63, at 1036-38 (explaining that the ICJ
held that an armed attack does not include weapons or logistical support to rebels).
118. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 141 (explaining that the ICJ also
discussed the sorts of acts considered to be armed attacks).
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attack is always a prerequisite for using force in self-defence."19 The
Court's holding avoids the issue:
In view of the circumstances in which the dispute has arisen, reliance is
placed by the Parties only on the right of self-defence in the case of an
armed attack which has already occurred, and the issue of the lawfulness
of a response to the imminent threat of an armed attack has not been
raised. Accordingly the Court expresses no view on that issue.
120
The references in this case to individual or collective self-defence
requiring an armed attack for justification are therefore taken out of
the context of the judgment.'21
Judge Schwebel, in a strong and detailed dissenting opinion,
recalled that the ICJ had not expressed a view on the issue of
anticipatory self-defence.122  He stated that the Judgment,
nevertheless, might "be open to the interpretation of inferring that a
[s]tate may react in self-defence... only if an armed attack
occurs."' 123 Judge Schwebel therefore chose not to leave the question
open and took the opportunity to make comments:
I wish.., to make clear that, for my part, I do not agree with a
construction of the United Nations Charter which would read Article 51
as if it were worded: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual of collective self-defence if, and only if, an
armed attack occurs. . . ." I do not agree that the terms or intent of Article
51 eliminate the right of self-defence under customary international law,
or confine its entire scope to the express terms of Article 51.124
119. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J at 103 (indicating that
the ICJ is not expressing a view of the issue of the lawfulness of a response to an
imminent threat of armed attack).
120. Id. at 103.
121. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 141-43 (suggesting that arguments that
the ICJ would have found in favour of a right to anticipatory self-defence are
speculative).
122. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 347 (Judge
Schwebel dissenting) (stating that the ICJ "observes that the issue of the lawfulness
of a response to the imminent threat of armed attack has not been raised in this





It is, however, important that the right of self-defence should not
freely allow the use of force in anticipation of an attack or in
response to a threat of force.'25 At the same time, we must recognize
that there may well be situations in which the imminence of an attack
is so clear and the danger is so great that defensive action is essential
for self-preservation of a state. 26 The next Part will, therefore,
discuss the essential conditions for the admissibility of the plea of
anticipatory self-defence in a given case.
IV. CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF
ANTICIPATORY SELF-DEFENCE
What is the customary international law of anticipatory self-
defence? The answer begins with the Caroline case. During the 1837
Canadian insurrection, rebels made preparations in U.S. territory for
subversive action against the British Authorities.'27 In particular,
rebels looted a U.S. arsenal in Buffalo to obtain arms.'28 The United
States acted properly in taking measures against the organisation of
armed forces upon its soil so that no breach of duty could be alleged
against its authorities. 2 9 However, the steamer Caroline was
reinforcing and provisioning the rebels in Upper Canada from ports
in the United States. 3' While the vessel was anchored on the United
States' side of the boarder of the Niagara River, an armed band under
the command of a British officer crossed the river, set fire to the
vessel, and cut it loose to float over the Niagara Falls.' 3' The United
States was understandably upset that the British raided and destroyed
125. See Report of the Committee on Use of Force in Relations Among States,
supra note 38, at 203-04 (suggesting that Article 51 should not be given the effect
of eliminating the customary law right of self-defence).
126. Id.
127. See 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217
(1906) (explaining the events surrounding the Caroline case); 1 D.P. O'CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 316 (2d ed. 1970) (noting that courts often invoke the
Caroline case when handling issues of self-defence).
128. See MOORE, supra note 127, §17; O'CONNELL, supra note 127, at 316.
129. See MOORE, supra note 127, §17; O'CONNELL, supra note 127, at 316.
130. See MOORE, supra note 127, §17; O'CONNELL, supra note 127, at 316.
131. See ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 141 (discussing customary law on self-
defence).
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an American ship in U.S. territory. In response to American protests,
Great Britain offered self-defence as a justification for the
destruction of the vessel.'
In the diplomatic exchange that followed, Secretary of State
Daniel Webster stated in a letter of April 24, 1841 to the British
Government that:
[u]nder these circumstances, and under those immediately connected with
the transaction itself, it will be for Her Majesty's Government to show
what state of facts, and what rules of national law, the destruction of the
Caroline is to be defended. It will be for that Government to show a
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation.
133
132. Id.
133. Letter of Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (April 24, 1841), in 29 BRITISH AND
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1840-41 at 1137-38 (1857). The British Government
accepted the definition of Mr. Webster in a letter sent by Lord Ashburton to Mr.
Webster on July 28, 1842, but disagreed on the facts:
Agreeing, therefore, on the general principle and on the possible exceptions to
which it is liable, the only question between us is, whether this occurrence
came within the limits fairly to be assigned to such exceptions: whether, to
use your words, there was 'that necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means' which preceded the destruction of
the Caroline, while moored to the shore of The United States?
Letter of Mr. Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 8, 1842), in 30 BRITISH AND
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1841-1842, at 196 (1858) (arguing that the act of
destruction of the Caroline was wrong).
I would appeal to you, Sir, to say whether the facts which you say would
alone justify the act, viz., 'a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation,' were not
applicable to this case in as high a degree as they ever were to any case of a
similar description in the history of nations.
Id. at 198. Mr. Webster repeated his definition in his letter of August 6, 1842 to
Lord Ashburton:
Undoubtedly it is just, that while it is admitted that exceptions growing out of
the great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to
cases in which 'the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming,
and leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.'
Id. at 241 (responding to Lord Ashburton's letter regarding the Caroline).
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This definition created a limited right of preventive action because
it did not require an actual armed attack.'34
The classical definition of the Caroline case is still relevant for
anticipatory self-defence today. 3 ' Moreover, the preconditions set in
the Caroline case have been extended to the right of self-defence in
general, which is quite logical, as the right of anticipatory self-
defence is only a form of the more general customary right of self-
defence, and the conditions for the application of both rights have to
be more or less the same. Roberto Ago came to a similar conclusion
as Secretary of State Daniel Webster when he wrote that the essential
preconditions of "self-defence in general" are "necessity,"
"proportionality" and "immediacy."' 3 6 These principles are moreover
followed by the ICJ, when it held that "[t]here is a specific rule
whereby self-defence would warrant only measures which are
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule
well established in customary international law."'3 7
The preconditions for anticipatory self-defence are, therefore,
"necessity," "proportionality," and "immediacy."' 38 However, it
seems reasonable to add two more conditions: first, an action of
anticipatory self-defence will only be justified if the U.N. Security
Council has not yet been able to take affirmative action, and second,
134. See Clemmons & Brown, supra note 23, 220-21 (explaining that Secretary
of State Webster's expression of self-defence became the standard of the right of
self-defence); see also ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 141 (describing the test for
self-defence as set forth by Secretary of State Webster); R.Y. Jennings, The
Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82-99 (1938) (recounting the
development of self-defence legal doctrine); Lohr, supra note 17, at 17 (explaining
the element of necessity in self-defence doctrine); Wright, supra note 12, at 44-45
(recounting the diplomatic correspondence between Lord Ashburton and Secretary
of State Webster).
135. See Michael Lacey, Self-Defence or Self-Denial: The Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 293, 294 (2000)
(describing how the Caroline standard still applies to issues of self defence in
recent U.S. military action against Libya, Afghanistan, and Sudan).
136. See Ago, supra note 11, at 68-69, para. 119 (describing requirements
frequently viewed as essential conditions for admissibility of self-defence pleas).
137. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94
(June 27).
138. See Ago, supra note 11, at 68-69, para. 119 (describing requirements
frequently viewed as essential conditions for admissibility of self-defence pleas).
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the state against which the right of anticipatory self-defence is being
exercised has to be in breach of international law.
A. CAPACITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The last part of the first sentence of Article 51 reads that states can
only exercise their inherent right of self-defence (including
anticipatory self-defence) "until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."' 13 9
It goes without saying that this recognition of liberty for the state
acting in self-defence (or in anticipatory self-defence) would
likewise disappear, under the system contemplated by the U.N.
Charter, as soon as the U.N. Security Council took it upon itself to
employ the enforcement measures necessary for ensuring the full
respect of a situation jeopardized by this aggression. 40
This is a clear limitation, imposed by the U.N. Charter, upon the
inherent customary right of anticipatory self-defence in international
law. 1
41
However, if the action of the United Nations is obstructed, delayed
or inadequate and the armed attack becomes manifestly imminent,
then it would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter to compel a
defending state to allow its assailant to deliver the first and perhaps
fatal blow. 1
42
B. FLOUTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
Second, a state finds itself in a position of anticipatory self-
defence when it is confronted by an unlawful armed attack or an
unlawful threat of force by another state. 143
139. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (allowing Members to use military action to defend
their territory).
140. Ago, supra note 11, at 53, para. 87.
141. Waldock, supra note 32, at 497-98.
142. Id.; see also Kelsen, supra note 13, at 793 (explaining that the U.N.
Security Council may restrict Members' ability to defend themselves).
143. See discussion infra Part II.D (noting that a defending state can take
military action against an attacking state under international law).
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This state of affairs exonerates a state from the duty to respect,
vis-A-vis the aggressor, the general obligation to refrain from the use
of force.' "It was the first [s]tate which created the danger and
created it by conduct which is not only wrongful in international law,
but which constitutes the most serious and unmistakable international
offence of recourse to armed force in breach of the general existing
prohibition of such recourse," under customary international law and
under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.'45
C. NECESSITY
The third condition for the application of the right of anticipatory
self-defence is the necessity-test. The state threatened with imminent
attack must not, in the particular circumstances, have had any means
of halting the attack other than recourse to armed force. 46 There
must be clear and present danger of an imminent attack, and not
mere general preparations by the enemy. 47 If a state "had been able
to achieve the same result by measures not involving the use of
armed force, it would have no justification for adopting conduct
which contravened the general prohibition against the use of armed
force."'
148
The decision to use force in anticipatory self-defence is generally a
conditioned reflex to stress. 149 Probably the situation that fits this
144. See Ago, supra note 11, at 53, para. 87 (explaining the general obligation to
refrain from use of force).
145. Ago, supra note 11, at 53-54, para. 88.
146. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 208 (arguing that the attacked state must
verify that peaceful settlement is not possible before initiating military action).
147. See ERICKSON, supra note 33, at 140 (noting that the requirement of "clear
and present danger of an imminent attack" precludes legal attacks on the basis of
an enemy's military preparations).
148. Ago, supra note 11, at 69, para. 120; see DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 208
(stating that the defending state should be certain that negotiating a reasonable
settlement is not possible before resorting to war).
149. See Newcomb, supra note 97, at 621 (analyzing the Israeli attack against
Egypt and Syria in the Six Days War and concluding that this reaction is a
conditioned reflex to stress).
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necessity-test best is the 1967 attack by Israel against the Arab States
in the region. '15 0
After the Soviet Union falsely reported to the United Arab
Republic ("UAR") that Israel was planning a major attack on the
UAR, President Gamal Abdel Nasser took several very provocative
actions: the UAR moved a force large enough to conduct offensive
operations into the Sinai; Nasser publicly made statements that he
intended to eliminate Israel; the UAR dismissed the U.N. emergency
force from the Sinai; and the UAR closed the Straits of Tiran to
Israel. 5 '
Palestinian forces simultaneously infiltrated along the border
between Israel and Syria.'52 In June of 1967, Israel mounted a
massive air campaign against UAR airfields and eventually captured
the Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights in ground
maneuvers against the UAR, Jordan, and Syria.'53 Israel argued that
the attack was justified because the UAR's decision to close the
Straits of Tiran was an act of war by the UAR, and the massing of
the UAR troops on the borders of Israel posed a serious and
imminent threat to Israel's security. 5 4 Israel struck pre-emptively
against the Arab coalition of the UAR, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq to
150. Id. (noting that the Six Days War serves as a classic depiction of this reflex
to stress).
151. Sean M. Condron, Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the
Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115,
136-137 (1999); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE
ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 101-02 (2002) (describing the
UAR's conduct preceding the outbreak of hostilities); George P. Fletcher,
Domination in the Theory ofJustification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 557
(1996) (emphasizing that President Nassar repeatedly made "bellicose threats"
against Israel); Eugene V. Rostow, The Drafting of Security Council Resolution
242: The Role of the Non-Regional Actors, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 489, 491-
94, 496-98 (1993) (highlighting various factors which contributed to the Six Day
War and emphasizing the important role of Soviet disinformation in inflaming
hostilities).
152. See FRANCK, supra note 151, at 102 (suggesting that the increase of
Palestinian forces along the Israeli border contributed to heightened tensions).
153. See Condron, supra note 151, at 136 (describing the conflict); FRANCK,
supra note 156, 102-103 (describing Israeli gains during the war).
154. See FRANCK, supra note 151, and 102-03 (describing the reasons for
Israel's perception of an Arab threat and Israeli gains during the war).
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prevent an attack.' The discussion that followed in the U.N.
Security Council was predominantly a result of Cold War feuding
between the East and the West. 156 The delegates spent very little time
actually addressing the right of anticipatory self-defence.' 57 They
linked the return of the land to satisfaction of Israel's reasonable
security concerns.'58
A special factor to consider in terms of the necessity test is the
nature of the weapon.'5 9 For instance, the United States imposed a
"quarantine" on Cuba in 1962, subsequent to the installation of
Soviet missiles on the island, because this installation of missiles
could only be considered as a direct nuclear threat to the United
States. 60 Even in the absence of an armed attack, the threat of
nuclear warfare was a sufficient ground for the anticipatory self-
defence measure of the quarantine.'
6'
155. Condron, supra note 151, at 137; see also FRANCK, supra note 151, at 103
(noting Professor Weisburd's conclusion that the war began with Israel's
"preemptive air strike").
156. A series of U.N. Security Council resolutions strongly condemned Israel's
actions. E.g., S.C. Res. 233, U.N. SCOR, 2288th Meet., U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1352
(1967); S.C. Res. 234, U.N. SCOR, 1350th Meet., U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 1352 (1967);
S.C. Res. 235, U.N. SCOR, 1352nd Meet., S/P.V. 1352 (1967); S.C. Res. 236,
U.N. SCOR, 1357th Meet., U.N. Doe. S/P.V. 1352 (1967); S.C. Res. 237, U.N.
SCOR, 1361st Meet., U.N. Doc. S/RES/237 (1967); S.C. Res. 240, U.N. SCOR,
1371st Meet., U.N. Doc. S/RES/240 (1967); S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 1382nd
Meet., U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (1967).
157. See Condron, supra note 151, at 136-37 (noting that the Cold War politics
dominated the debate).
158. See FRANCK, supra note 151, at 101-05 (citing Professor Weisburd's
summary that the international community determined that Israel could not retain
any of the conquered territories, but Israel could link the return of the lands to the
furtherance of Israel's security goals).
159. See infra notes 160-161 and accompanying text (describing the Cuban
Missile Crisis as a situation where the type of weapon at issue was crucial for
calculating a military response).
160. See Mallison, supra note 63, at 340-43 (emphasizing that the Soviet
missiles were "offensive" weapons with nuclear capabilities).
161. See id. at 344-64 (analyzing national self-defence theories and their validity
in international law); see also FRANCK, supra note 151, at 99-101; McDougal,
supra note 49, at 602 (noting that the U.S. action was solely defensive). Contra
Sadurska, supra note 82, at 254-58 (explaining that the U.S. quarantine probably
did not meet the international standards of a defensive action).
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One can apply the same principle to the Israeli raid on the Osirak
Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction at Tuwaitha in 1981. The
nuclear devices produced by Iraq would ultimately be delivered
against Israeli targets. 62 The launch of thirty-nine Scud missiles
against the Israeli civilian population during the Persian Gulf War in
1991 leaves no doubt about the danger that Israel faced and the real
danger Israel would have faced had Prime Minister Begin not
previously asserted Israel's right of anticipatory self-defence and
destroyed Saddam's nuclear weapons program.163  (Another
justification of the Israeli act would have rested on the state of war
that was, and still is, in progress between the two countries.) 64
162. See Uri Shoham, The Grenada Intervention: The Israeli Aerial Raid upon
the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor and the Right of Self-Defence, 109 MIL. L. REV. 191,
191 (1985) (noting that the Prime Minster of Israel, Menachem Begin, decided that
destruction of the Iraqi reactor was essential for Israeli security because he implied
that Iraq could have deployed these weapons against Israel).
163. See A Rejoinder, supra note 63, at 447-48 (noting that the danger to Israel
was very real because the U.N. inspectors determined that Iraq had a covert
nuclear weapons facility and suggesting that the fact that Iraq attacked Israeli
civilian targets in the Gulf War proves that Israel properly protected its people
from a possible nuclear attack); see also Shoham, supra note 63, at 191 (reporting
that the Prime Minster of Israel, Menachem Begin, had argued that the attack on
the reactor was necessary because Iraq planned to use it to manufacture bombs for
use against Israel).
Imagine if Iraq had been armed with nuclear weapons during the Gulf War.
At least some of its forty or more Scud missiles that bombarded Israel and
Saudi Arabia would then have had thermonuclear warheads that would have
killed millions of innocent people - vastly more than the deaths resulting from
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.... But the
foregoing scenario would not have occurred. Instead, the threat to Israel and
its neighbours would have been so great that Operation Desert Storm against
Iraq probably would not have been mounted by the United States and other
countries. Instead, Saddam Hussein would probably have gotten away with
his aggression against Kuwait. And if that had happened, Saddam's dementia
combined with vast oil wealth and a nuclear capability could have altered for
the worse the course of human history. Israel's pre-emptive strike against the
Iraqi nuclear installation in Osiraq ironically benefited Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia even more that itself.
Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike against the Osiraq Reactor: A
Retrospective, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 259, 259 (1996).
164. See MCCORMACK, supra note 16, at 291. A number of commentators favor
the self-defence argument. See, e.g., Polebaum, supra note 63, 217-28 (analyzing
the Israeli action and finding that Israel had satisfied all legal requirements with
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Although many governments and the Security Council rejected the
Israeli position that Saddam Hussien was deceiving U.N. inspectors
and was building up an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in
1981, it proved to be a visionary one. 165 Ten years later, the majority
of the civilized world was at war with Iraq.
16
D. PROPORTIONALITY
Another condition for an action taken in anticipatory self-defence
is the requirement of proportionality. War is generally waged to
bring about the destruction of the enemy's army regardless of the
condition of proportionality, but the doctrines of self-defence and
anticipatory self-defence, require a symmetry or an approximation
between the action and its purpose, namely that of preventing the
attack from occurring. 167
It would be mistaken, therefore, to think that there must be
necessarily proportionality between the conduct constituting the
armed force and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt and
repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions
disproportionate to those of the attack suffered. What matters in this
respect is the result to be achieved by the defensive action, and not
the forms, substance and strength of the action itself.
1 68
The 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of Nuclear Weapons did not reject the possibility of resort to nuclear
the exception of proving that there were no other reasonable alternatives). Other
commentators are opposed to the self-defence argument. See, e.g., Uri Shoham,
supra note 63, at 217-24 (finding that the Israeli action was legal under
international standards of self-defence); Newcomb, supra note 97, at 626-27
(arguing that the Israeli action was illegal).
165. See G.A. Res. 36/27, U.N. SCOR, 56th Meet., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/27
(1981) (condemning the Israeli actions); see also Condron, supra note 151, at 115-
25 (describing the international struggle to inspect Iraqi facilities in order to
assuage the international community's concerns that Iraq was producing banned
weapons of mass destruction).
166. See Condron, supra note 151, at 116-19 (noting that the effort to expel Iraqi
forces from Kuwait was an international effort under U.N. authority).
167. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 208 (noting the importance of balancing
the unlawful force and the lawful counter-force according to measures of the
totality of the situation).
168. Ago, supra note 11, at 69-70, para. 121.
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weapons "in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the
very survival of a [s]tate would be at stake. ' 69 In other words, when
the very existence of the state is menaced, the state can employ
weapons of mass destruction, irrespective of their disproportionate
character to the aggressor's arsenal.7 0
E. IMMEDIACY
Finally, anticipatory self-defence to the threat of force should take
place immediately (i.e., while the threat is still going on, and not
after it has ended). If, however, the threat or the attack in question
consisted of a number of successive acts, and there is sufficient
reason to expect a continuation of acts from the same source, the
international community should view the requirement of the
immediacy of the self-defensive action in the light of those acts as a
whole. 171 At all events, practice and doctrine seem to endorse this
requirement, which is not surprising in view of its plainly logical link
with the whole concept of self-defence. 72 Such an attack would be
one of anticipatory self-defence and not of reprisal, since its prime
motive would be protective, not punitive."3 A reprisal for revenge or
as a penalty (or a "lesson") would not be lawful.174
169. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (United Nations), 1996
I.C.J. 244 (July 8) para. 105(2)E (stating the Court's decision); see also DINSTEIN,
supra note 23, at 210 (explaining the import of the ICJ's opinion).
170. See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 210 (exploring the possibility of using
nuclear weapons for self-defence).
171. See Ago, supra note 11, at 70 (advising that armed resistance to attack
should occur immediately).
172. See Report of the Committee on Use of Force in Relations Among States,
supra note 38, at 206 (noting that if a state can reasonably assume that it will suffer
continuous attacks an action against the attacking state would be protective, not
punitive); Romano, supra note 63, at 1056-57 (suggesting that new threats, such as
terrorism, require a more flexible self-defence standard).
173. See Report of the Committee on Use of Force in Relations Among States,
supra note 38, at 206 (arguing that such an attack would not be anticipatory, but
protective); J. Nicholas Kendall, Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Target Killings"
Under International Law, 80 N.C.L. REV. 1069, 1081-88 (2002) (noting that the
killings are preventative and are not reprisals because the purpose of the killings is
to protect the state).
174. See Bowett, supra note 63, at 4 (explaining the nature of reprisals).
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The military operation against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan by the
United States and its Allies can be considered an act of anticipatory
self-defence.'75 Since Al Qaeda was responsible for numerous
terrorist attacks against the United States, and Osama bin Laden, the
prksident-fondateur of Al Qaeda, specifically promised to continue




"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you."'1 77 The
world would be a peaceful place to live, were this Golden Rule the
basic standard of behaviour in international law. Unfortunately, it is
not. States and their citizens are confronted with suicide bombers,
state-sponsored terrorism, and wide scale aggression. 178
The right of self-defence, inherent in every state, includes
logically the right of anticipatory self-defence, ensuring that a
defender has sufficient flexibility to take defensive hostile measures
without waiting for the attack. 79 A state that would renounce the
right of anticipatory self-defence could be indefensible in a world
175. See infra note 176 and accompanying text (noting that, as Al Qaeda has
promised to continue attacks against the United States, the U.S. government should
take action against Al Qaeda).
176. See Thomas M. Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defence, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 839, 839-43 (2001); see also Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert,
"Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War:" The Law and Politics of Labels,
36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 60 (2003) (noting that the Bush Administration found
that Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, were responsible for the series of
attacks on September 1 1th, 2001 and previous attacks on American interests,
prompting a war under the theory of self-defence against Al Qaeda, sparking
substantial legal controversy).
177. Book of Tobit 4:15 (New Am. Bible) ("Do to no one what you yourself
dislike."); Sirach/Ecclesiasticus 31:15 (New Am. Bible) ("Recognize that your
neighbour feels as you do, and keep in mind your own dislikes.); Matthew 7:12
(New Am. Bible) ("Do to others whatever you would have them do to you. This is
the law and the prophets.").
178. See Lacey, supra note 135, at 293-97 (describing the constant struggle
governments face in combating varied forms of terrorisms and violence, including
state and non-state supported terrorism).
179. See Clemmons & Brown, supra note 23, at 228 (arguing that anticipatory
self-defence is not a new concept as it is a subset of the right to self-defence).
2003]
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without a central world body that could prevent powerful aggressor
states from acting at will.8
The elasticity of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence should
however not be stretched past logic and into fantasy"'1 "In the
absence of a clear immediate threat, explaining one [s]tate's
aggression or violation of another [s]tate's territorial sovereignty can
lead to some unsubstantial claims."' 2 "Without the sine qua non of
necessity, proportionality and immediacy, anticipatory self-defence
becomes nothing more than a slippery slope of naked aggression."'' 3
180. For instance, "for a [s]tate such as Israel, a [s]tate less than half the size of
San Bernardino County in California that is surrounded by twenty hostile Arab
States, such renunciation could be tantamount .to acceptance of its own genocide."
Louis Rene Beres, A Rejoinder, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 445, 445 & 449
(1995).
181. See Lacey, supra note 135, at 294 (cautioning governments against reliance
on an overly expansive definition of self-defence to justify their military actions).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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